For China Commission, Warnings and Advice For Trump’s “Donroe Doctrine” in Latin America

Last November, the White House released its National Security Strategy of the United States that laid out the Trump administration’s strategy for the Americas. In it, the strategy imperative for the region said that one of Washington’s key goals was to make sure the Americas remains “free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets,” and was supportive of U.S. access to critical supply chains. China wasn’t mentioned by name as the hostile adversary, but China is precisely who the White House had in mind. For the region, the November release of the National Security Strategy means Washington plans to “assert and enforce” what they referred to as the “Trump Corollary” to the old Monroe Doctrine; something many have jokingly referred to today as the Donroe Doctrine.

But last week, seven experts from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Inter-American Dialogue, long embedded into the politics of Latin America, told the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission that the new hemispheric strategy was okay – providing they are not presenting it as an “us versus them” strategy. The takeaway from the hearing was that China was not going away and that taking coercive measures against Latin American countries, forcing them into a foreign policy and trade dependency on the whims of Washington was bound to fail.

Latin American countries are pursuing deals with China not because China is the best offer, but because China is the only player and the only ones making the proposal. These countries might want companies from other countries to come in and make a bid in an auction, for example, but they do not. It’s always China.

– Victoria Chonn Ching, Non-Resident Fellow, Atlantic Council

China does not impose conditions on trade and investment when they come to Latin America, said Parsifal D’Sola, Founder and Executive Director of the Andrés Bello Foundation’s China Latin America Research Center. [Testimony] China defines its role as non-invasive and they largely maintain a position of political detachment while putting money to work in necessary, and underfunded items – like critical infrastructure projects.

“The structural conditions still benefit China,” he said. “These countries have a need for long term investment in infrastructure and diversification from the U.S. China entered a market where the U.S. left, or didn’t bother to show up. And even though Latin America has strong social connections to the United States culturally, which cannot be said about their ties to China, these relations can be eroded if the U.S. is going to prioritize control over cooperation and partnership.”

Francisco Bencosme, Former China Policy Lead at the now defunct U.S. Agency for International Development [Testimony] said Trump’s team has to “articulate a vision of partnership, not exclusion to any one country because these countries are focused on economic diversification.” He also questioned whether the new NSS for the Americas would last beyond Trump, or if the Americas will be forgotten as it was prior to this newfound interest in the region on account of China’s rise there.

“No U.S. strategy will kick China out of the region,” he said. This was pretty consistent across viewpoints in the two panel discussions. “On trade and investment, the U.S. should prioritize advanced technologies, renewables, and emerging technologies. We need strategic, high level, economic statecraft because China has been successful in presenting our policies as coercive and not aligned with local government interest. We will need to give them choices and not make them forced to choose between us or China,” he said.

In some sectors, Latin American countries have mostly already chosen due in part to U.S. corporate absence.

“One of the main things for the U.S. to make this strategy work is simply to be present,” said Victoria Chonn Ching of the Atlantic Council [Testimony].

In many sectors, the U.S. has already lost, she said.

We Lost Cars, Can We Lose Space Next?

Ching gave an example on one sector U.S. companies might no longer find worth investing in: battery powered cars.

“China moved manufacturing plants to Brazil to build EVs there. There is no competition from the United States,” she said. Ford moved out of Brazil during the pandemic after being there since 1921. “Maybe Chinese EVs and buses might not last long, but for Brazilians, they can buy two or three and replace them at less cost. I would say don’t try and compete with China where you don’t have a competitive advantage and this area is one of them.”

Ching said that the space industry was an interesting entry point for the U.S. as China’s Starlink rival, SpaceSail, is now operating in Brazil. It’s not a far stretch to say that SpaceSail was also chosen by the Brazilian government to launch low orbit satellites for retail internet connections because of its fight with Elon Musk over posts on X critical of a Supreme Court judge. Other space related business has centered on using Brazil’s Alcantara Launch Center, but no launches have occurred. For now, a U.S. Space Command 2024 agreement with Brazil focused solely on data-sharing and joint operations, opening doors for defense-related space tech collaborations. Opportunities exist in suborbital tests, satellite deployment, and equatorial orbits.

See CPA’s report with the Prague Security Studies Institute on China’s ambitious space program here.

China has been in Brazil’s space industry for decades. The joint China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) program, launched in 1988, remains a cornerstone agreement with multiple satellites developed collaboratively for Earth observation. Recent efforts include the CBERS-5 development valued at around $1 billion. This partnership has produced over a dozen satellites, enhancing remote sensing and data sharing, but they are launched from China.

Port infrastructure was huge. China was a dominant player all along the port ecosystem, from managing ports, to owning specialty terminals, to being the builders of the cranes and the biggest brands in port surveillance and security software. Again, China does not want to be one piece of the puzzle; it wants to be the entire border.

“Often we think that the ports are outposts for future military bases. That risk is overblown. The real risk is much scarier,” said Henry Ziemer, Associate Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies [Testimony]. He came short of daring Washington to let China one day own and operate port infrastructure along the Strait of Magellan, the southernmost strait between Chile and Antarctica.

“Ports grant you a window into the plumbing of the global economy. Eight percent of our trade moves by sea and to see where that trade is going and to whom offers a remarkably granular look at global supply chains and that includes info on U.S. military ships that might be in one of those ports,” Zeimer said. “The more ports you control, the more control you have over the global economy.”

He gave an example of a way China could manipulate shipments and delivery dates thanks to their port positions. For instance, last year, the critical mineral antimony was hard to get and if you ordered it from Australia to go to Mexico, it first took a stop at a port in China. “That shipment was opened and investigated,” Zeimer said. “The ability to slow transport like that is dangerous and deserves more attention.”

Antimony hardens lead and tin alloys for batteries, bullets, solders, and bearings, while also serving as a flame retardant.

“I certainly think that Chinese state-owned enterprises going out and cementing control over critical ports and specialized terminals for oil and minerals exports globally is quite concerning.”

Mexico and Brazil Most Worried About China

Both the left wing governments and the right wing governments are open to U.S. investment and want partnerships, panelists said.

But it is the Mexicans and Brazilians who worry about China most.

“Both of them see China as a major industrial competitor. That is also a concern for them, as it is for us,” said D’Sola.

Chinese industrial policy impacts their domestic industries, said Margaret Myers, Senior Advisor at the Asia and Latin America Program at the Inter-American Dialogue [Testimony]. She named three high wage sectors – aerospace, pharmaceuticals and machinery – as potentially doomed to Chinese imports.

There is deep concern that China investment will encourage a deindustrialization process in the region. Whether that plays out remains to be seen. I think China is concerned about that. They try to develop the message that they are partners; but still there are more and more exports coming to Latin America from China. The term I hear is ‘inundated.’ They are being flooded and this will impact the relationship over the next few months.

– Margaret Myers, Senior Advisor, Inter-American Dialogue

Brazil is China’s No. 1 partner in the Americas, followed by Mexico.

For Ching at The Atlantic Council, Chinese companies have been making investments in Mexican infrastructure a priority, though there are large factories in Monterrey, not far from the U.S. border, that have broken ground in the last two years.

“Their relationship with Mexico fluctuates between becoming closer to becoming more tense, but that is going to depend on who is leading the country,” said Ching. “Mexican leadership is prioritizing its relationship with the U.S. and China will follow that lead.”

Mexico is a special case, thanks to the USMCA. No country in Latin America is more dependent on the U.S. than Mexico, despite free trade agreements with the European Union and closer ties to China than ever before. Mexico is pretty much stuck in the U.S. orbit; it shares a border, and it receives upwards of $60 billion a year in remittances from Mexicans living here. So prioritizing the U.S. makes sense. It might make less sense for Brazil and other countries, unless the U.S. can sell them on it.

Myers recommends what everyone else recommends.

Trump cannot be too coercive or forceful, which is a tough sell given current foreign policy action in Iran, and talks of “taking over” Cuba.

If there is a sense of bullying, Myers warned the Commission, “these countries will turn to China. There is a very mixed reception in the region of the U.S., though the same goes for China. Keep in mind that all of them are going to weigh the costs of depending too much on any one nation – including too much on the U.S., or too much on China.”