America is finally getting serious about its dangerous dependence on foreign-made generic drugs.
Nearly 90 percent of all prescriptions in the U.S. are generics, covering thousands of products — from blood pressure medicines to chemotherapy injectables. And the overwhelming majority of those products rely on Chinese and Indian supply chains.
President Trump understands the threat. He campaigned last year on a promise of reshoring production of essential medicines.
And he meant it on reshoring. Instead of the traditional platitudes of “level the playing field”, the President promised to use “tariffs and import restraints” so our nation could be self-reliant for essential medicines.
As it happens, there’s one industry where we’ve already done that: sugar. It’s a perfect model for generic drugs.
Enter the Section 232 Pharma Action
President Trump’s first step to reshoring pharmaceuticals began in April, when his Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick and Under Secretary Jeffrey Kessler launched a “Section 232” national security investigation regarding America’s reliance on imports of pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical ingredients.
This investigation confers upon the President broad latitude to “adjust” imports in a manner to safeguard domestic production and supply.
The market landscape for branded drugs is completely different from generics, however.
And with generics, even a 100% tariff would fail to bring back production.
Why Even a 100% Tariff Won’t Work
Known formally as “ad valorem tariffs”, percentage-based tariffs are applied against what the importer alleges they paid overseas for the product.
We’re all familiar with sales taxes, and so these percentage rates are intuitively familiar. But in practice, it’s not nearly as neat as applying a sales tax against a publicly-advertised sales price by a domestic business. There are a myriad of issues, including rampant invoice fraud, problems in generating reasonable “transfer” prices when the overseas manufacturer and the domestic importer are related entities, and elaborate legal loopholes like the “first sale” rule.
Suffice it to say, the importer’s alleged import price is virtually always something less than wholesale cost, and a fraction of consumer retail price.
But with generics, there’s a much bigger issue than the standard ad valorem issues, and that has to do with the fact that most of the markup for generics is in domestic distribution, after importation.
For example: if an overseas manufacturer’s price to manufacture a dose is a fraction of a penny, and the U.S. importer’s purchase price is $0.01 per dose, then adding a 100% tariff would only bring you to two cents per dose.
The one-extra penny added by the 100% tariff is totally immaterial given that by the time it reaches the ultimate purchaser, the retail price is likely orders-of-magnitude higher. The extreme markups in domestic distribution are due largely to so-called “Pharmacy Benefit Managers” (PBMs). As Representative Diana Harshbarger (R-Tenn.) describes, PBMs are “shadowy middlemen [that] self-deal and manipulate the system in ways that are driving up drug costs”. Rep. Jake Auchincloss (D-Mass) says “[t]he PBM industry is rife with self-dealing that raises costs for patients and bankrupts independent pharmacists.”
Lipitor markup example
Atorvastatin (brand name: Lipitor) is a widely prescribed generic statin for cholesterol management. The most common dosage is a 40mg tablet.
We don’t know an importer’s actual cost (this is private), but the government does maintain something called the National Average Drug Acquisition Cost database (NADAC), which tracks the approximate invoice price that retail pharmacies pay for medications in the United States.
For August 2025, the NADAC price for a 40 mg tablet was 4 cents a tablet. The importer’s purchase price was likely a fraction of this, but let’s say it was 3 cents.
Costco Pharmacy charges 27 cents for that tablet ($7.99 for a bottle of 30 tablets).
Thus, even on one of the most widely prescribed and common generic drugs, adding a 100% tariff equates to just a few cents per dosage: a tiny fraction of the consumer retail price. And that’s assuming the importer’s true purchase price (considering all rebates) is used, which, given what our political leaders tell us about PBMs, cannot be assured.
The examples are far more stark for lower-volume generics. The nonprofit 46brooklyn maintains a “Top 20 Over $20” chart, documenting the “20 top drugs (ranked by absolute markup dollars) that sported a markup per prescription of $20 or more for any state that has managed care”. The nonprofit argues that “most pharmacy dispensing fee surveys result in break-even professional dispensing fees of around $10-$11 per prescription. So once we get to $20, we feel comfortable claiming that this is pushing the bounds of what’s reasonable.”
Top of the list: Ondansetron (also known by the brand name Zofran), an anti-nausea drug used for cancer patients, with a markup per script of $147.48.
With an utterly broken domestic pricing market, using ad valorem tariffs as a one-size fits all for reshoring generic drugs will absolutely not work.
Look to Sugar as a Model: tariffs assessed on volume of an import, not alleged value, plus tightly controlled import quota
What’s needed is the same approach we use in sugar, another product for which we remain import reliant while also seeking to protect domestic producers. With sugar, instead of an across the board ad valorem tariffs, we use “specific tariffs” applied against the amount of sugar that actually shows up on a ship. Not whatever price the importer claims they paid overseas.
With sugar, we also use a finite import quota limited to licensed importers. And that quota is regularly adjusted based on forecasted domestic consumption, and production both at home and in import-concession countries.
For example, in 2024, when El Niño caused a substantial drop in sugar production for the Phillipines, one of our top sugar suppliers, USDA and USTR were able to promptly reallocate quota to ensure steady U.S. supply.
Furthermore, adopting quarterly inclusion rounds, as the Department of Commerce is doing for other sectoral tariff actions, will allow for ongoing refinement, driving further reshoring.
Sugar’s Sweet “Tariff Rate Quota” (TRQ) Model
With a TRQ, the government sets annual quantities (the “quota”) that can enter at a lower “revenue” tariff that can help pay for domestic subsidies, and everything above that is subject to a high, protective tariff, which gives domestic producers certainty as to how much of the domestic market will be supplied by imports. For refined sugar, it looks like this:
In-quota: 3.66 ¢/kg
Over-quota: 35.74¢/kg
So, for example, if the quota was 10,000 metric tons, then the first 10,000 metric tons imported during the year would be subject to the 3.66 ¢/kg, and any subsequent imports that year would be subject to a 35.74 ¢/kg duty.
Why have two rates? Why not just cap the imports? Hard caps on imports is what is known as an “Absolute Quota”, and they also exist in our tariff schedule. The United States has a hard cap – an absolute quota – of 739,860 whisked broom imports per year. (President Clinton increased this quota so high as to be meaningless.) Absolute quotas, however, lack the ‘safety-valve’ feature of protective over-quota tariffs.
Absolute Quota Versus TRQ’s “Safety-Valve” Approach
Once an absolute quota is hit, that’s it, nothing clears the port until the next quota round opens up; usually, the following quarter.
By contrast, TRQs can simultaneously provide home market protection while facilitating import access in emergencies. With over-quota rates in tariff, the trick is to set a tariff rate that would discourage regular procurement of imports over domestic production, but also allow for ‘emergency’ imports.
The art of setting up a tariff rate quota often comes down as follows:
Set an “in-quota” tariff such that imports are no longer so much cheaper than domestic like-products that importers are rushing to fill up import quota every quarter.
Set an “over-quota” tariff rate that is sufficiently high that no one would plan on procuring the import at that tariff price, but also not so high that in the event of an emergency and no available domestic capacity, supply can be imported. You want to be in something akin to “speeding ticket” range. Unfortunate if it happens, and you would never plan on it, but it doesn’t break the purchaser’s bank if the fee gets assessed on the odd shipment.
For example, if an institutional purchaser – say, a hospital group – accidentally spoils a batch of drugs, or loses them in a fire, and are unable to source any more from domestic producers. That’s the kind of situation where it’s nice if they can essentially ‘pay a bit more’ and import at an over-quota rate, assuming there is no more domestic capacity to cover the shortage.
Some Real-World Generic Drug TRQ Examples
Oxford Pharmaceuticals is the leading U.S. generic drug manufacturer, currently producing 13 different generic drugs, but with more capacity to grow. Thanks to them, we can mock up some real world examples.
The table below compares the import price versus Oxford Pharmaceuticals’ manufacturing price for three drugs: Amlodipine, Buspirone, and Spironolacton. You can see that the difference between the import price and the domestic manufacturing cost is a small fraction – roughly 10% – of Medicare’s purchasing cost. There is no reason whatsoever for reshoring to drive up health care costs, especially as ultra-low import prices tend to only materialize in response to domestic manufacturing. Indeed, it is quite possible that for other drugs, there will be an acquisition cost savings upon reshoring.
Product
Import Price
USA Mfg. Cost
Medicare’s Acquisition Cost
Suggested In-Quota Tariff
Suggested Over-Quota Tariff
Amlodipine
0.8¢
1.9¢
10.2¢
2¢
4¢
Buspirone
1.2¢
2.7¢
18.3¢
3¢
6¢
Spironolactone
2.9¢
3.75¢
19¢
4¢
8¢
Also in the table above, we offer suggested in-quota and over-quota tariff rates:
In-quota tariff rates roughly equalize the import cost (with a little comfort room to spare).
Over-quota tariff rates are a bit more than double the domestic manufacturing cost. But still not so high as to be totally prohibitive. Still well below Medicare’s current acquisition cost.
Quota volumes
Having set in-quota and over-quota rates, we must now turn to quota volumes.
How much product (in our cases, how many doses) can be imported each month at the in-quota rate before the over-quota rate kicks in.
The following is the monthly U.S. consumption (measured in doses) of each drug, as well as Oxford’s monthly production capacity. The consumption figures come from IQVIA. For each of these drugs, Oxford is the only U.S. manufacturer, and thus represent current U.S. production capacity. The current demand, minus current domestic production capacity, represents our net-import reliance.
Product
Monthly Demand
Domestic Production Monthly Capacity (Doses)
Monthly Net-Import Reliance (Doses)
(Doses)
Amlodipine
416,337,460
83,267,492
333,069,968
Buspirone
177,073,367
79,683,015
97,390,352
Spironolactone
122,084,333
80,472,408
41,611,925
In-quota volumes should approximate our net-import reliance. Whether setting the quota period on a monthly or quarterly basis would be a good topic to solicit feedback on, but both should be manageable.
Changing In-Quota Volumes Based on New Domestic Production
Setting a TRQ isn’t about handing out monopolies. If a new entrant thinks they can profitably make a drug in America, they should be encouraged to petition Commerce to reduce the quota by their new capacity.
The petitioning need not be difficult or secretive. In fact, the Department of Commerce already has an excellent template for companies to petition for “inclusion”.
Earlier this year, Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), overseen by Under Secretary Kessler, launched the first ever “Inclusion Round” for the Steel and Aluminum Section 232 tariffs. The process was a tremendous success, with over fifty domestic producers and producer associations submitting “inclusion” requests to expand tariff coverage to Made-in-USA goods.
The Inclusion Rounds for steel and aluminum take place for two weeks each January, May, and September, and allow manufacturers of derivative steel and aluminum products the ability to extend tariff coverage to their downstream product.
The Inclusion Round for the Pharmaceutical 232 is the perfect vehicle for incentivizing domestic production of generic drugs by assuring producers that they will have a domestic market available to them without being undercut. If a producer fails to deliver, raising the quota allocation is a trivial matter.
Helping out other countries with Good Manufacturing Practices
Another lesson from sugar: import licensing keeps quota benefits with real producers, not speculators. For sugar and other agricultural quota goods, regulations require that quota-rate imports be brought in by licensed importers, with eligibility rules and annual allocations (7 CFR Part 6, Subpart B). We also work with foreign ministries, which assign their own sugar producers “Certificates of Quota Eligibility” (“CQEs”). When a licensed importer attempts to enter an in-quota shipment, they must provide the CQE obtained from the foreign country. CBP requires submission of the certificates before the shipment can clear.
This is an exceptional system for deterring transshipment of Chinese and Indian products, as Ministries in developed pharmaceutical-producing nations are self-interested in fighting against this fraud. Under this framework, imports from allied countries that maintain high manufacturing standards — such as the European Union, which adheres to strict GMPs (Good Manufacturing Practices) — would be favored for quota concessions. This would benefit them, as the burden would fall squarely on adversarial suppliers like China and India, where weak standards and subsidies undermine fair competition.
An excellent example of how restricting access to our market for a given drug would be well received by other countries with Good Manufacturing Practices is valsartan (an ARB blood-pressure drug).
KRKA d.d. is a Slovenian manufacturer and markets valsartan in the EU under brands like Valsacor. KRKA, however, is in vicious price competition with Asian suppliers with documented quality problems. In 2018, the FDA and EMA found nitrosamine (NDMA/NDEA) impurities in valsartan API made by Zhejiang Huahai (China), triggering global recalls. On Sept. 28, 2018, the FDA issued an import alert blocking ZHP valsartan API and finished drugs that used it.
European generics like KRKA are competing in the same molecule class while a major low-cost Chinese API source suffered serious, regulator-verified quality lapses—materially reshaping supply (recalls, re-sourcing, price/supply shocks). We can thus simultaneously restrict access to our market with a TRQ while also privileging responsible imports from allied countries, ensuring a welcome reception to the TRQ from Canada, Europe, Japan, Korea, and more friendly countries.
MADE IN AMERICA.
CPA is the leading national, bipartisan organization exclusively representing domestic producers and workers across many industries and sectors of the U.S. economy.
To Reshore Generic Drugs, Use Sugar’s Sweet Model
By CPA President Jon Toomey
America is finally getting serious about its dangerous dependence on foreign-made generic drugs.
Nearly 90 percent of all prescriptions in the U.S. are generics, covering thousands of products — from blood pressure medicines to chemotherapy injectables. And the overwhelming majority of those products rely on Chinese and Indian supply chains.
President Trump understands the threat. He campaigned last year on a promise of reshoring production of essential medicines.
And he meant it on reshoring. Instead of the traditional platitudes of “level the playing field”, the President promised to use “tariffs and import restraints” so our nation could be self-reliant for essential medicines.
As it happens, there’s one industry where we’ve already done that: sugar. It’s a perfect model for generic drugs.
Enter the Section 232 Pharma Action
President Trump’s first step to reshoring pharmaceuticals began in April, when his Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick and Under Secretary Jeffrey Kessler launched a “Section 232” national security investigation regarding America’s reliance on imports of pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical ingredients.
This investigation confers upon the President broad latitude to “adjust” imports in a manner to safeguard domestic production and supply.
The President’s recent threat of a 100% tariff on imports of branded drugs by companies that aren’t actively reshoring is based on this Section 232 authority.
The market landscape for branded drugs is completely different from generics, however.
And with generics, even a 100% tariff would fail to bring back production.
Why Even a 100% Tariff Won’t Work
Known formally as “ad valorem tariffs”, percentage-based tariffs are applied against what the importer alleges they paid overseas for the product.
We’re all familiar with sales taxes, and so these percentage rates are intuitively familiar. But in practice, it’s not nearly as neat as applying a sales tax against a publicly-advertised sales price by a domestic business. There are a myriad of issues, including rampant invoice fraud, problems in generating reasonable “transfer” prices when the overseas manufacturer and the domestic importer are related entities, and elaborate legal loopholes like the “first sale” rule.
Suffice it to say, the importer’s alleged import price is virtually always something less than wholesale cost, and a fraction of consumer retail price.
But with generics, there’s a much bigger issue than the standard ad valorem issues, and that has to do with the fact that most of the markup for generics is in domestic distribution, after importation.
For example: if an overseas manufacturer’s price to manufacture a dose is a fraction of a penny, and the U.S. importer’s purchase price is $0.01 per dose, then adding a 100% tariff would only bring you to two cents per dose.
The one-extra penny added by the 100% tariff is totally immaterial given that by the time it reaches the ultimate purchaser, the retail price is likely orders-of-magnitude higher.
The extreme markups in domestic distribution are due largely to so-called “Pharmacy Benefit Managers” (PBMs). As Representative Diana Harshbarger (R-Tenn.) describes, PBMs are “shadowy middlemen [that] self-deal and manipulate the system in ways that are driving up drug costs”. Rep. Jake Auchincloss (D-Mass) says “[t]he PBM industry is rife with self-dealing that raises costs for patients and bankrupts independent pharmacists.”
Lipitor markup example
Atorvastatin (brand name: Lipitor) is a widely prescribed generic statin for cholesterol management. The most common dosage is a 40mg tablet.
We don’t know an importer’s actual cost (this is private), but the government does maintain something called the National Average Drug Acquisition Cost database (NADAC), which tracks the approximate invoice price that retail pharmacies pay for medications in the United States.
For August 2025, the NADAC price for a 40 mg tablet was 4 cents a tablet. The importer’s purchase price was likely a fraction of this, but let’s say it was 3 cents.
Costco Pharmacy charges 27 cents for that tablet ($7.99 for a bottle of 30 tablets).
Thus, even on one of the most widely prescribed and common generic drugs, adding a 100% tariff equates to just a few cents per dosage: a tiny fraction of the consumer retail price. And that’s assuming the importer’s true purchase price (considering all rebates) is used, which, given what our political leaders tell us about PBMs, cannot be assured.
The examples are far more stark for lower-volume generics. The nonprofit 46brooklyn maintains a “Top 20 Over $20” chart, documenting the “20 top drugs (ranked by absolute markup dollars) that sported a markup per prescription of $20 or more for any state that has managed care”. The nonprofit argues that “most pharmacy dispensing fee surveys result in break-even professional dispensing fees of around $10-$11 per prescription. So once we get to $20, we feel comfortable claiming that this is pushing the bounds of what’s reasonable.”
Top of the list: Ondansetron (also known by the brand name Zofran), an anti-nausea drug used for cancer patients, with a markup per script of $147.48.
With an utterly broken domestic pricing market, using ad valorem tariffs as a one-size fits all for reshoring generic drugs will absolutely not work.
Look to Sugar as a Model: tariffs assessed on volume of an import, not alleged value, plus tightly controlled import quota
What’s needed is the same approach we use in sugar, another product for which we remain import reliant while also seeking to protect domestic producers. With sugar, instead of an across the board ad valorem tariffs, we use “specific tariffs” applied against the amount of sugar that actually shows up on a ship. Not whatever price the importer claims they paid overseas.
With sugar, we also use a finite import quota limited to licensed importers. And that quota is regularly adjusted based on forecasted domestic consumption, and production both at home and in import-concession countries.
For example, in 2024, when El Niño caused a substantial drop in sugar production for the Phillipines, one of our top sugar suppliers, USDA and USTR were able to promptly reallocate quota to ensure steady U.S. supply.
Furthermore, adopting quarterly inclusion rounds, as the Department of Commerce is doing for other sectoral tariff actions, will allow for ongoing refinement, driving further reshoring.
Sugar’s Sweet “Tariff Rate Quota” (TRQ) Model
With a TRQ, the government sets annual quantities (the “quota”) that can enter at a lower “revenue” tariff that can help pay for domestic subsidies, and everything above that is subject to a high, protective tariff, which gives domestic producers certainty as to how much of the domestic market will be supplied by imports. For refined sugar, it looks like this:
So, for example, if the quota was 10,000 metric tons, then the first 10,000 metric tons imported during the year would be subject to the 3.66 ¢/kg, and any subsequent imports that year would be subject to a 35.74 ¢/kg duty.
Why have two rates? Why not just cap the imports? Hard caps on imports is what is known as an “Absolute Quota”, and they also exist in our tariff schedule. The United States has a hard cap – an absolute quota – of 739,860 whisked broom imports per year. (President Clinton increased this quota so high as to be meaningless.) Absolute quotas, however, lack the ‘safety-valve’ feature of protective over-quota tariffs.
Absolute Quota Versus TRQ’s “Safety-Valve” Approach
Once an absolute quota is hit, that’s it, nothing clears the port until the next quota round opens up; usually, the following quarter.
By contrast, TRQs can simultaneously provide home market protection while facilitating import access in emergencies. With over-quota rates in tariff, the trick is to set a tariff rate that would discourage regular procurement of imports over domestic production, but also allow for ‘emergency’ imports.
The art of setting up a tariff rate quota often comes down as follows:
For example, if an institutional purchaser – say, a hospital group – accidentally spoils a batch of drugs, or loses them in a fire, and are unable to source any more from domestic producers. That’s the kind of situation where it’s nice if they can essentially ‘pay a bit more’ and import at an over-quota rate, assuming there is no more domestic capacity to cover the shortage.
Some Real-World Generic Drug TRQ Examples
Oxford Pharmaceuticals is the leading U.S. generic drug manufacturer, currently producing 13 different generic drugs, but with more capacity to grow. Thanks to them, we can mock up some real world examples.
The table below compares the import price versus Oxford Pharmaceuticals’ manufacturing price for three drugs: Amlodipine, Buspirone, and Spironolacton. You can see that the difference between the import price and the domestic manufacturing cost is a small fraction – roughly 10% – of Medicare’s purchasing cost. There is no reason whatsoever for reshoring to drive up health care costs, especially as ultra-low import prices tend to only materialize in response to domestic manufacturing. Indeed, it is quite possible that for other drugs, there will be an acquisition cost savings upon reshoring.
Product
Import Price
USA Mfg. Cost
Medicare’s Acquisition Cost
Suggested In-Quota Tariff
Suggested Over-Quota Tariff
Amlodipine
0.8¢
1.9¢
10.2¢
2¢
4¢
Buspirone
1.2¢
2.7¢
18.3¢
3¢
6¢
Spironolactone
2.9¢
3.75¢
19¢
4¢
8¢
Also in the table above, we offer suggested in-quota and over-quota tariff rates:
Quota volumes
Having set in-quota and over-quota rates, we must now turn to quota volumes.
How much product (in our cases, how many doses) can be imported each month at the in-quota rate before the over-quota rate kicks in.
The following is the monthly U.S. consumption (measured in doses) of each drug, as well as Oxford’s monthly production capacity. The consumption figures come from IQVIA. For each of these drugs, Oxford is the only U.S. manufacturer, and thus represent current U.S. production capacity. The current demand, minus current domestic production capacity, represents our net-import reliance.
Product
Monthly Demand
Domestic Production Monthly Capacity (Doses)
Monthly Net-Import Reliance (Doses)
(Doses)
Amlodipine
416,337,460
83,267,492
333,069,968
Buspirone
177,073,367
79,683,015
97,390,352
Spironolactone
122,084,333
80,472,408
41,611,925
In-quota volumes should approximate our net-import reliance. Whether setting the quota period on a monthly or quarterly basis would be a good topic to solicit feedback on, but both should be manageable.
Changing In-Quota Volumes Based on New Domestic Production
Setting a TRQ isn’t about handing out monopolies. If a new entrant thinks they can profitably make a drug in America, they should be encouraged to petition Commerce to reduce the quota by their new capacity.
The petitioning need not be difficult or secretive. In fact, the Department of Commerce already has an excellent template for companies to petition for “inclusion”.
Earlier this year, Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), overseen by Under Secretary Kessler, launched the first ever “Inclusion Round” for the Steel and Aluminum Section 232 tariffs. The process was a tremendous success, with over fifty domestic producers and producer associations submitting “inclusion” requests to expand tariff coverage to Made-in-USA goods.
The Inclusion Rounds for steel and aluminum take place for two weeks each January, May, and September, and allow manufacturers of derivative steel and aluminum products the ability to extend tariff coverage to their downstream product.
The Inclusion Round for the Pharmaceutical 232 is the perfect vehicle for incentivizing domestic production of generic drugs by assuring producers that they will have a domestic market available to them without being undercut. If a producer fails to deliver, raising the quota allocation is a trivial matter.
Helping out other countries with Good Manufacturing Practices
Another lesson from sugar: import licensing keeps quota benefits with real producers, not speculators. For sugar and other agricultural quota goods, regulations require that quota-rate imports be brought in by licensed importers, with eligibility rules and annual allocations (7 CFR Part 6, Subpart B). We also work with foreign ministries, which assign their own sugar producers “Certificates of Quota Eligibility” (“CQEs”). When a licensed importer attempts to enter an in-quota shipment, they must provide the CQE obtained from the foreign country. CBP requires submission of the certificates before the shipment can clear.
This is an exceptional system for deterring transshipment of Chinese and Indian products, as Ministries in developed pharmaceutical-producing nations are self-interested in fighting against this fraud. Under this framework, imports from allied countries that maintain high manufacturing standards — such as the European Union, which adheres to strict GMPs (Good Manufacturing Practices) — would be favored for quota concessions. This would benefit them, as the burden would fall squarely on adversarial suppliers like China and India, where weak standards and subsidies undermine fair competition.
An excellent example of how restricting access to our market for a given drug would be well received by other countries with Good Manufacturing Practices is valsartan (an ARB blood-pressure drug).
KRKA d.d. is a Slovenian manufacturer and markets valsartan in the EU under brands like Valsacor.
KRKA, however, is in vicious price competition with Asian suppliers with documented quality problems. In 2018, the FDA and EMA found nitrosamine (NDMA/NDEA) impurities in valsartan API made by Zhejiang Huahai (China), triggering global recalls. On Sept. 28, 2018, the FDA issued an import alert blocking ZHP valsartan API and finished drugs that used it.
European generics like KRKA are competing in the same molecule class while a major low-cost Chinese API source suffered serious, regulator-verified quality lapses—materially reshaping supply (recalls, re-sourcing, price/supply shocks). We can thus simultaneously restrict access to our market with a TRQ while also privileging responsible imports from allied countries, ensuring a welcome reception to the TRQ from Canada, Europe, Japan, Korea, and more friendly countries.
MADE IN AMERICA.
CPA is the leading national, bipartisan organization exclusively representing domestic producers and workers across many industries and sectors of the U.S. economy.
TRENDING
CPA Calls for Replacing USMCA with Two Bilateral Agreements to Restore U.S. Trade Sovereignty
CPA Releases New Economics Report: “Section 232 Steel Tariffs Are Necessary For National Security”
Beef Prices: Blame the Packers, Not America’s Ranchers
Senate Witnesses Discuss Reshoring and Making China’s Massive Biotech Ecosystem Less Attractive for Big Pharma
With China Agreement Complete, CPA Urges Trump Administration to Prioritize 232 Investigations and Domestic Producers
The latest CPA news and updates, delivered every Friday.
WATCH: WORTH FIGHTING FOR
Get the latest in CPA news, industry analysis, opinion, and updates from Team CPA.
CHECK OUT THE NEWSROOM ➔