New research reveals how Chinese state-controlled companies under the auspices of the PLA are targeting the entire space ecosystem in America’s backyard, funded, in part, by scores of millions of unsuspecting American retail investors.
The Coalition for a Prosperous America (CPA) and the Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI) have released a joint report, U.S. Underwriting of Chinese Military Companies Operating in Latin America, which details how Beijing is working to penetrate and control the space sectors of Latin American countries through dozens of ostensibly commercial agreements concluded with its state-controlled Chinese space companies that, in effect, act as fronts for the People’s Liberation Army. To add insult to injury, this Chinese strategy of what PSSI terms “space sector capture” is being funded, in no small part, by average American investors.
Following on an initial report on China’s global program of “space sector capture,” Ground Game of Authoritarian Space Powers (CPA/PSSI, August 14, 2025), this new report provides an in-depth look into the sphere of Chinese space operations with the greatest proximity to the United States.
Space Sector Capture in Launch, the Ground Sector, and Exploration
The report first provides a detailed assessment of the extent of China’s penetration of Latin American space sectors, The researchers recorded 94 deals between Latin American countries and Chinese or Russian entities between 1988 and 2025 (48 Chinese and 46 Russian deals), with China overtaking Russia in all sectors except launch since Russia’s annexation of Crimea and full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022.
China’s inroads in Latin America also reflect the breadth of its engagement: its deals are distributed across space systems, ground infrastructure, and launch services, often paired with training. This reflects a whole-of-sector approach by China, reinforced by agreements involving research, equipment sales, launch and PNT services, e, education, Earth Observation, direct satellite data provision and subsidized financing.
Penetration of Argentina, Venezuela and Brazil
The report then conducts an in-depth review of three selected countries: Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil. The report details how across all three countries, Chinese entities, primarily state-owned, have captured the supply of satellites, launch services, ground stations, remote sensing, and telemetry, tracking and control, along with personnel and financing. The location and capabilities of the Chinese-linked ground stations across these countries strongly point to these facilities as likely supporting Chinese military and intelligence activities.
China’s array of “space sector capture” activities also include Argentina and Venezuela signing agreements for participation in China’s International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) planned for construction on the South Pole of the Moon. In the case of Venezuela, participation of an astronaut in a Chinese lunar mission is likewise involved.
The report finds that Brazil constitutes China’s most mature model of Latin American space sector capture. For example, in 2023, the Brazilian Space Agency and the China National Space Administration signed a ten-year strategic space partnership that. among other provisions, will continue the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) program of Chinese-launched satellites. CBERS-6 is planned to include a synthetic aperture radar (SAR), allowing data collection regardless of cloud cover, weather, or lighting conditions, data that would be managed through Chinese-linked systems and institutions, all controlled by the PLA.
Space Sector Capture in Education and Training
Breaking new ground, the report reveals how, in the cases of Venezuela and Brazil, Chinese engagement is not limited to satellites, launch services, and ground infrastructure – it also includes a structured academic pipeline. Venezuelan and Brazilian personnel are receiving training, including space project management and microsatellite technology, at Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, also known as Beihang University (BUAA).
BUAA is one of China’s “Seven Sons of National Defense,” a group of elite, state-funded universities overseen by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). They are renowned for their deep integration with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), supplying approximately 75% of the graduates hired by China’s state-owned defense enterprises.
Thus, China’s program of space sector capture has expanded into advanced training and human-capital development. The result is a deeper form of dependence that extends beyond hardware and into institutional knowledge, operational doctrine, and future program management. The report concludes that “this combination of equipment, technology and services provision, technical training, and institutional access secures for China a multi-layered presence in the space sectors of targeted, ‘partner’ nations.”
PLA Dominion over China’s Space Sector
Lest there be any doubt about the People’s Liberation Army’s control over these activities, the report provides an in-depth look at five of the major entities engaged in China’s space sector campaign. Not only are these entities engaged in hundreds of joint projects with the PLA, but the report also reveals that they host “military representative offices” from multiple PLA service branches. The report concludes that, taken together, these embedded PLA offices and project linkages demonstrate that these companies function as core military-civil fusion nodes where China’s civilian-labeled space activities directly support PLA requirements.
Financing of the Chinese Space Sector with American Capital
The report finds that, although Chinese state-owned and controlled actors engaged in military or other malign activities dominate Beijing’s space sector activity in Latin America, Western capital can still flow easily and legally to these entities, because they frequently rely on a network of publicly listed subsidiaries and affiliates to attract U.S. and other allied investment: “This layered corporate architecture enables Chinese PLA-linked space actors to maintain access to Western financing, which materially advances Beijing’s broader geopolitical and military objectives.”
For example, regarding the leading actor in Latin America, the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), “PSSI’s research indicates that, across 12 publicly listed subsidiaries, Western investment exposure to CASC-linked entities exceeds $60 million, with major asset managers such as BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, JPMorgan, and others among the larger investors.”
CASC also holds a controlling interest in ZTE, the publicly listed telecommunications firm that has faced U.S. sanctions and restrictions for illegally exporting U.S.-origin technology to embargoed jurisdictions, including Iran and North Korea. “Despite these restrictions, American and allied financial institutions continue to invest in ZTE. Across its Shanghai and Hong Kong listings, ZTE has received more than $1 billion in investment from Western financial institutions alone.”
The report also notes Tencent’s involvement in Latin America’s space sector, stemming from its participation in the 2017 Series B funding round for Satellogic, then a Uruguayan company, to which Tencent contributed an estimated $27 million. The report notes that Tencent is still attracting hundreds of billions of dollars of U.S. and allied investment — despite U.S. military procurement restrictions and inclusion on the Pentagon’s Section 1260H list, much of it provided by the holdings of Vanguard, Fidelity, and State Street as well as Norway’s Sovereign Wealth Fund.
The report concludes that “across CETC-linked entities ($232.7 million), CASC-linked entities ($173 million), CCCG-linked entities ($480 million), and ZTE ($1 billion), Western funding — including joint venture funds — totals approximately $1.8 billion. This amount is comparable to the estimated minimum value of Chinese space-related projects in Latin America assessed in this report.”
Recommendations
Not content to merely identify the problem, the report’s authors make a series of recommendations to address the commercial, political, and national security threats posed by China’s ambitious campaign to takeover key Latin American space sectors and its partial funding by U.S. investors, among them:
Close off subsidiary and affiliate loopholes in sanctions and investment restrictions. Future capital markets sanctions and security-minded investment screening measures should account for the full “family tree” corporate architecture of China’s vertically-integrated state-controlled space enterprises, defense industrial firms, research institutes, and university-linked entities.
Expand outbound investment screening for dual-use space and defense-linked equipment, technologies and services, particularly positioning, navigation and timing systems. U.S. and European policymakers should strengthen financial intelligence-gathering and conduct persistent monitoring of Western capital flows into Chinese PLA-controlled space entities on a real-time basis.
Offer credible and competitive Western alternatives across the full space sector value chain. The United States and Europe should prioritize affordable, secure, transparent, and reliable alternatives for LATAM partners across the spectrum of space services and infrastructure.
Support LATAM partners in assessing sovereignty and dual-use risks. The United States, Europe, and allied partners should provide technical assistance, risk assessments, and procurement guidance to help LATAM countries evaluate the downsides and long-term security implications of partnerships with authoritarian space powers.
Include security-minded diligence in all space partnerships. Space partnerships should not be treated as narrow scientific or commercial undertakings. Space projects and programs are strategic infrastructure with direct implications for national sovereignty, security, defense, policy planning and crisis resilience.
Conclusion and Call to Action
The report finds that the gradual loss of sovereignty over parts, or all, of the sensitive space sectors of the targeted countries in Latin America is an urgent concern which will require U.S. and allied public-private partnerships to remedy. Barring such government involvement, it is all but certain that China’s predatory, unfair and extortionary trade practices in the space domain, powered by strategic calculations, will prevail in any competitive contract negotiations.
The report’s authors conclude that failure to provide trusted alternatives and stronger safeguards will likely increase Chinese leverage over critical space infrastructure in Latin America and beyond.
CPA is the leading national, bipartisan organization exclusively representing domestic producers and workers across many industries and sectors of the U.S. economy.
Report: China’s Capture of Latin American Space Sectors
New research reveals how Chinese state-controlled companies under the auspices of the PLA are targeting the entire space ecosystem in America’s backyard, funded, in part, by scores of millions of unsuspecting American retail investors.
The Coalition for a Prosperous America (CPA) and the Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI) have released a joint report, U.S. Underwriting of Chinese Military Companies Operating in Latin America, which details how Beijing is working to penetrate and control the space sectors of Latin American countries through dozens of ostensibly commercial agreements concluded with its state-controlled Chinese space companies that, in effect, act as fronts for the People’s Liberation Army. To add insult to injury, this Chinese strategy of what PSSI terms “space sector capture” is being funded, in no small part, by average American investors.
Following on an initial report on China’s global program of “space sector capture,” Ground Game of Authoritarian Space Powers (CPA/PSSI, August 14, 2025), this new report provides an in-depth look into the sphere of Chinese space operations with the greatest proximity to the United States.
Space Sector Capture in Launch, the Ground Sector, and Exploration
The report first provides a detailed assessment of the extent of China’s penetration of Latin American space sectors, The researchers recorded 94 deals between Latin American countries and Chinese or Russian entities between 1988 and 2025 (48 Chinese and 46 Russian deals), with China overtaking Russia in all sectors except launch since Russia’s annexation of Crimea and full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022.
China’s inroads in Latin America also reflect the breadth of its engagement: its deals are distributed across space systems, ground infrastructure, and launch services, often paired with training. This reflects a whole-of-sector approach by China, reinforced by agreements involving research, equipment sales, launch and PNT services, e, education, Earth Observation, direct satellite data provision and subsidized financing.
Penetration of Argentina, Venezuela and Brazil
The report then conducts an in-depth review of three selected countries: Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil. The report details how across all three countries, Chinese entities, primarily state-owned, have captured the supply of satellites, launch services, ground stations, remote sensing, and telemetry, tracking and control, along with personnel and financing. The location and capabilities of the Chinese-linked ground stations across these countries strongly point to these facilities as likely supporting Chinese military and intelligence activities.
China’s array of “space sector capture” activities also include Argentina and Venezuela signing agreements for participation in China’s International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) planned for construction on the South Pole of the Moon. In the case of Venezuela, participation of an astronaut in a Chinese lunar mission is likewise involved.
The report finds that Brazil constitutes China’s most mature model of Latin American space sector capture. For example, in 2023, the Brazilian Space Agency and the China National Space Administration signed a ten-year strategic space partnership that. among other provisions, will continue the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) program of Chinese-launched satellites. CBERS-6 is planned to include a synthetic aperture radar (SAR), allowing data collection regardless of cloud cover, weather, or lighting conditions, data that would be managed through Chinese-linked systems and institutions, all controlled by the PLA.
Space Sector Capture in Education and Training
Breaking new ground, the report reveals how, in the cases of Venezuela and Brazil, Chinese engagement is not limited to satellites, launch services, and ground infrastructure – it also includes a structured academic pipeline. Venezuelan and Brazilian personnel are receiving training, including space project management and microsatellite technology, at Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, also known as Beihang University (BUAA).
BUAA is one of China’s “Seven Sons of National Defense,” a group of elite, state-funded universities overseen by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). They are renowned for their deep integration with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), supplying approximately 75% of the graduates hired by China’s state-owned defense enterprises.
Thus, China’s program of space sector capture has expanded into advanced training and human-capital development. The result is a deeper form of dependence that extends beyond hardware and into institutional knowledge, operational doctrine, and future program management. The report concludes that “this combination of equipment, technology and services provision, technical training, and institutional access secures for China a multi-layered presence in the space sectors of targeted, ‘partner’ nations.”
PLA Dominion over China’s Space Sector
Lest there be any doubt about the People’s Liberation Army’s control over these activities, the report provides an in-depth look at five of the major entities engaged in China’s space sector campaign. Not only are these entities engaged in hundreds of joint projects with the PLA, but the report also reveals that they host “military representative offices” from multiple PLA service branches. The report concludes that, taken together, these embedded PLA offices and project linkages demonstrate that these companies function as core military-civil fusion nodes where China’s civilian-labeled space activities directly support PLA requirements.
Financing of the Chinese Space Sector with American Capital
The report finds that, although Chinese state-owned and controlled actors engaged in military or other malign activities dominate Beijing’s space sector activity in Latin America, Western capital can still flow easily and legally to these entities, because they frequently rely on a network of publicly listed subsidiaries and affiliates to attract U.S. and other allied investment: “This layered corporate architecture enables Chinese PLA-linked space actors to maintain access to Western financing, which materially advances Beijing’s broader geopolitical and military objectives.”
For example, regarding the leading actor in Latin America, the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), “PSSI’s research indicates that, across 12 publicly listed subsidiaries, Western investment exposure to CASC-linked entities exceeds $60 million, with major asset managers such as BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, JPMorgan, and others among the larger investors.”
CASC also holds a controlling interest in ZTE, the publicly listed telecommunications firm that has faced U.S. sanctions and restrictions for illegally exporting U.S.-origin technology to embargoed jurisdictions, including Iran and North Korea. “Despite these restrictions, American and allied financial institutions continue to invest in ZTE. Across its Shanghai and Hong Kong listings, ZTE has received more than $1 billion in investment from Western financial institutions alone.”
The report also notes Tencent’s involvement in Latin America’s space sector, stemming from its participation in the 2017 Series B funding round for Satellogic, then a Uruguayan company, to which Tencent contributed an estimated $27 million. The report notes that Tencent is still attracting hundreds of billions of dollars of U.S. and allied investment — despite U.S. military procurement restrictions and inclusion on the Pentagon’s Section 1260H list, much of it provided by the holdings of Vanguard, Fidelity, and State Street as well as Norway’s Sovereign Wealth Fund.
The report concludes that “across CETC-linked entities ($232.7 million), CASC-linked entities ($173 million), CCCG-linked entities ($480 million), and ZTE ($1 billion), Western funding — including joint venture funds — totals approximately $1.8 billion. This amount is comparable to the estimated minimum value of Chinese space-related projects in Latin America assessed in this report.”
Recommendations
Not content to merely identify the problem, the report’s authors make a series of recommendations to address the commercial, political, and national security threats posed by China’s ambitious campaign to takeover key Latin American space sectors and its partial funding by U.S. investors, among them:
Close off subsidiary and affiliate loopholes in sanctions and investment restrictions. Future capital markets sanctions and security-minded investment screening measures should account for the full “family tree” corporate architecture of China’s vertically-integrated state-controlled space enterprises, defense industrial firms, research institutes, and university-linked entities.
Expand outbound investment screening for dual-use space and defense-linked equipment, technologies and services, particularly positioning, navigation and timing systems. U.S. and European policymakers should strengthen financial intelligence-gathering and conduct persistent monitoring of Western capital flows into Chinese PLA-controlled space entities on a real-time basis.
Offer credible and competitive Western alternatives across the full space sector value chain. The United States and Europe should prioritize affordable, secure, transparent, and reliable alternatives for LATAM partners across the spectrum of space services and infrastructure.
Support LATAM partners in assessing sovereignty and dual-use risks. The United States, Europe, and allied partners should provide technical assistance, risk assessments, and procurement guidance to help LATAM countries evaluate the downsides and long-term security implications of partnerships with authoritarian space powers.
Include security-minded diligence in all space partnerships. Space partnerships should not be treated as narrow scientific or commercial undertakings. Space projects and programs are strategic infrastructure with direct implications for national sovereignty, security, defense, policy planning and crisis resilience.
Conclusion and Call to Action
The report finds that the gradual loss of sovereignty over parts, or all, of the sensitive space sectors of the targeted countries in Latin America is an urgent concern which will require U.S. and allied public-private partnerships to remedy. Barring such government involvement, it is all but certain that China’s predatory, unfair and extortionary trade practices in the space domain, powered by strategic calculations, will prevail in any competitive contract negotiations.
The report’s authors conclude that failure to provide trusted alternatives and stronger safeguards will likely increase Chinese leverage over critical space infrastructure in Latin America and beyond.
A complete copy of the report is available here.
For further information, please contact:
Mr. Nico Mastrangelo, Project Coordinator
Economic & Financial Statecraft Program
Prague Security Studies Institute
mastrangelo@pssi.cz
MADE IN AMERICA.
CPA is the leading national, bipartisan organization exclusively representing domestic producers and workers across many industries and sectors of the U.S. economy.
TRENDING
New Report Reveals China’s Plan to Dominate the Global Space Market, Supported by U.S. Investor Dollars
Report: China’s Capture of Latin American Space Sectors
No Longer With the Fed, Stephen Miran Can Now Tout Tariffs as Tax Policy
Why Beef Prices Are So High: America’s Cattle Industry Has Been Gutted
CCP Committee Questions Reasons Behind Some China Investment in U.S.
The latest CPA news and updates, delivered every Friday.
WATCH: WORTH FIGHTING FOR
Get the latest in CPA news, industry analysis, opinion, and updates from Team CPA.
CHECK OUT THE NEWSROOM ➔