AMERICA'S CHIP-FOR-CHIP TARIFF POLICY



THE URGENT FIGHT TO RECLAIM INDUSTRIAL INDEPENDENCE BEFORE IT'S TOO LATE

A CPA ECONOMICS REPORT

OCTOBER 2025

America's Chip-for-Chip Tariff Policy: The Urgent Fight to Reclaim Industrial Independence Before It's Too Late

By the Coalition for a Prosperous America (CPA)

Key Points

- **Official trade data underestimates America's true chip dependence:** Customs statistics record only *direct* semiconductor imports, but most U.S. chip imports arrive embedded in finished products such as cars, smartphones, and industrial electronics. When those hidden chip imports are included, U.S. import dependence rises from 69% to 83%, revealing how deeply America's semiconductor demand is met through foreign supply chains rather than domestic production.

- **The Chip-for-Chip Tariff Strategy Would Rebuild U.S. Industrial Capacity:** CPA estimates the policy could generate $230 billion in tariff revenue and catalyze $153 billion in private-sector semiconductor investment over five years, redirecting nearly $400 billion in total economic activity back to the United States.

- **Without Demand Incentives, U.S. Fabs Risk Remaining Underutilized:** Major U.S. technology and automotive companies continue sourcing cheaper offshore chips despite supply-chain risks. The Chip-for-Chip plan complements CHIPS Act investments by guaranteeing domestic demand for U.S.-made semiconductors and closing loopholes that allow foreign-made chips to enter as embedded components in imported finished goods.

The United States is standing at an industrial and national security crossroads. In the coming weeks, the Trump administration is expected to announce the results of its Section 232 investigation into semiconductor imports. At the same time, the Administration is expected to unveil its **"**Chip-for-Chip**"** tariff strategy, which grants temporary import credits to companies that invest in domestic semiconductor production and imposes a 100 percent tariff on firms that fail to meet those commitments. CPA estimates this policy could represent nearly $400 billion in total economic activity redirected to the United States over the next five years.

The stakes could not be higher. China's recent decision to tighten control over its rare earth exports — requiring global approval from Beijing for any product that contains materials mined or processed by China — is a geopolitical earthquake. As *Reuters* reported, Beijing is effectively ordering the world to submit to its authority for access to critical inputs needed for everything from smartphones to jet engines.

This new mandate is a warning to the world: China intends to control not only its own exports but also every global product containing a Chinese input, tool, or component. It is the clearest signal yet that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) aims to exercise extraterritorial authority over the global economy — a "foreign direct product" rule on steroids, expanding Beijing's control to every supply chain on Earth.

In this environment, the Trump administration's chip tariff plan is not just an economic policy — it's a national defense imperative. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick has emerged as one of the administration's most determined and results-driven leaders in

restoring U.S. semiconductor independence. In his recent *NewsNation* interview, Lutnick made clear that his objective — and President Trump's — is to **rebalance global chip production so that half of all chips used in the United States are made in the United States.**

Describing his "50-50" plan, Lutnick explained that he has personally pressed Taipei to shift investment and production to American soil, cutting U.S. dependence on Taiwan while strengthening both nations' security. As he told *NewsNation*, "My objective, and this administration's objective, is to get chip manufacturing significantly onshored — we need to make our own chips." Lutnick aims for the U.S. to reach 40% domestic production by the end of the current term — an effort requiring more than $500 billion in local investment. His ambitious plan demonstrates not only his deep understanding of the geopolitical and economic stakes, but his unwavering determination to ensure America can "do what we need to do, if we need to do it."

The Crisis of Overreliance on Foreign Supply Chains

For decades, the United States has hollowed out its industrial base, offshoring not only manufacturing but also the core materials and technologies that sustain our economy. Semiconductor production is the most glaring example. The United States now produces roughly 10% of the world's chips, and almost none of the advanced semiconductors needed for modern electronics and defense systems (figure 1).

Figure 1



Source: BCG/SIA • "Legacy chips" refer to logic chips at 28 nanometers or larger. "Most advanced chips" refer to logic chips at 10 nanometers or smaller.

While much of the public conversation focuses on advanced chips — the cutting-edge semiconductors powering artificial intelligence, data centers, and weapons systems — America's vulnerability extends across the entire semiconductor spectrum. The United States doesn't just depend on Asia for advanced chips; it depends on China for legacy chips — the "mature nodes" used in everything from cars and medical devices to industrial equipment and consumer electronics. These are the chips that keep the U.S. economy running, and yet, as CPA's 2023 *Cash Over Country* report exposed, American companies have poured billions into China's state-backed legacy semiconductor sector, effectively financing their own competition.

CPA's analysis found that U.S. technology firms like Intel, Qualcomm, and Texas Instruments have prioritized short-term profits over national security, partnering with Chinese foundries and joint ventures that directly benefit Beijing's industrial ambitions. Many of these

facilities — subsidized by the Chinese Communist Party — are part of China's broader effort to dominate global chip supply chains at every level, not just the high end. China now has the largest projected semiconductor manufacturing for 2025 as a result of these investments, the majority of which are for legacy nodes (figure 2).

Figure 2



Further, China's state-driven expansion into legacy semiconductor production poses a growing threat to global chip markets and U.S. industrial resilience. According to TrendForce, Chinese foundries are set to drive a 6 percent increase in global mature-node capacity in 2025, with Beijing's subsidies pushing its share of such output past 25 percent among major producers.

This shift poses an even greater risk to the United States because legacy chips are pervasive throughout the defense industrial base, transportation systems, and critical infrastructure; they already account for over 70 percent of global industry capacity. Losing access to these chips — or relying on adversarial nations to produce them — would paralyze the U.S. economy far faster than a shortage of advanced processors.

In short, the crisis in chips is not limited to the "AI future" — it's about the everyday technologies that sustain our society. The Trump administration's *Chip-for-Chip* tariffs and reshoring strategy must therefore treat legacy chips with the same urgency as advanced ones. As CPA warned, "China's plan to flood the world with cheap, subsidized legacy semiconductors is not just an economic strategy — it's a national security threat." Rebuilding capacity for both advanced and legacy chips is the only way to end America's dangerous overreliance on foreign supply chains and secure true semiconductor sovereignty.

Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick put it bluntly earlier this year:

> *"When I walked into this department, the United States of America had 2% market share. We were producing 2% of the chips we need... The thing about Taiwan is they make 95% of chips that we put in our phones, our cars — 95% are made 9,000 miles away and just 80 miles from mainland China."*

That proximity — both geographic and political — is an existential risk. The world's most advanced chips are manufactured in a region Beijing has openly threatened to seize. If China acts on that threat, the United States could lose access overnight to the technological lifeblood of its economy, military, and society.

And now, with China's threat of sweeping new rare earth export controls, that scenario extends far beyond semiconductors.

Rare earths are essential for nearly every modern technology — electric vehicles, wind turbines, fighter jets, missile systems, and medical imaging devices. By requiring every global company to obtain Chinese government approval before exporting any product that includes Chinese-mined or processed rare earth materials, Beijing has effectively declared regulatory sovereignty over the global economy.

This is nothing less than economic coercion — and the clearest proof that the United States must achieve complete internal resiliency and self-reliance in critical industries.

As J.P. Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon warned recently:

> *"It has become painfully clear that the United States has allowed itself to become too reliant on unreliable sources of critical minerals, products, and manufacturing."*

Dimon's words carry weight. When even Wall Street — historically a staunch defender of globalization — begins warning that dependence on China is a national liability, policymakers must act.

And now, Dimon is putting money behind the warning. JPMorgan has announced plans to mobilize up to $10 billion in investments for U.S. companies critical to national security and economic resilience — part of a broader $1.5 trillion initiative to rebuild strategic industries at home. Even America's largest financial institutions are beginning to recognize that industrial independence is not just patriotic — it makes economic sense.

The Threat of Low Domestic Demand

Despite the exposure of supply-chain vulnerabilities during COVID-19 and growing instability across the Taiwan Strait, the purchasing behavior of major U.S. technology and automotive companies continues to favor low-cost offshore chips over those produced domestically. The result is a chronic under-demand for U.S.-made semiconductors that leaves existing fabrication plants operating below their potential and undermines the economics of new investment under the CHIPS Act.

Global trade data reveals how the eleven countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China—key assembly hubs for multinationals like Apple and Samsung—represented close to 60% of global semiconductor imports in 2024 (figure 3).

Figure 3

China and ASEAN Countries Imported 59% of all Global Semiconductors in 2024

Percentage based off $1.4 trillion total global imports



Source: Global Trade Tracker

These countries import substantial quantities of chips for assembly and then export finished goods such as phones, computers, and vehicles to the United States, accounting for about 30% of U.S. imports of semiconductor-intensive products in 2024 (figure 4). At the same time, Mexico is the largest recipient of U.S. semiconductors, most of which are packaged into finished products that are then re-exported into the United States. This further reinforces how much U.S. chip demand is satisfied through offshore or cross-border production rather than direct purchases from domestic chip fabricators.

Figure 4

...Which Entered the U.S. as Finished Products

Percentage based off $768 billion worth of U.S. imports of the most semiconductor-intensive downstream industries



Source: Global Trade Tracker • HS Codes used were 8470, 8517, 8528, 8703, 8486, 8479, 9018, 8509, 8516, 8471, 8472, 8507, 8518, 8521, 8532, 8543, and 8544,

The Chip-for-Chip Plan: A Blueprint for Industrial Sovereignty

President Trump's forthcoming *Chip-for-Chip* policy is the most significant step yet toward ending this dependence and restoring U.S. technological independence.

The premise is simple but powerful: companies that import chips from abroad must manufacture an equivalent number in the United States. Under this model, importers can continue to bring in foreign chips — but only up to the level of their verified U.S. production commitments.

If a company pledges to build a U.S. fab capable of producing one million chips, it receives temporary import credits for that amount while the plant is under construction. Once completed, it must maintain a one-to-one ratio — importing no more chips than it manufactures in America. Failure to meet these commitments triggers a 100% tariff on foreign chips.

This approach directly aligns incentives with outcomes: it rewards companies that build in America and penalizes those that cling to the offshoring model that hollowed out the U.S. industrial base.

But for this policy to succeed, implementation must be airtight — no loopholes, no exemptions, and no room for multinational corporations to hide behind nebulous promises.

Accountability Measures Must Be Non-Negotiable

The *Chip-for-Chip* tariff framework will only work if it ensures real domestic demand for U.S.-made chips. That requires strict rules for companies pledging to build U.S. fabs:

1. Temporary Import Credits: Companies can import chips duty-free only while their U.S. expansion projects are on track and under construction.
2. Binding Investment Pledges: Import credits should correspond precisely to the scale and pace of their American manufacturing buildouts.
3. Clawback Provisions: If a company fails to fulfill its investment pledge, it must pay back every dollar of avoided tariffs — with interest.
4. Domestic Purchasing Incentive: Top semiconductor buyers like Apple, Samsung, Lenovo, Dell, HP, and Sony will be motivated to source from U.S. fabs first and commit to purchases from future capacity, in order to receive chip for chip import credits as that capacity is being built.

In September, top technology CEOs met with President Trump at the White House and collectively pledged $1.75 trillion in new U.S. investments, including $600 billion each from Apple and Meta, $40 billion from Microsoft, and $500 billion from OpenAI, SoftBank, and Oracle.

These promises are enormous — but history shows that corporate pledges often evaporate once public scrutiny fades. To prevent this, every commitment must be enforceable, time-bound, and tied directly to tariff relief.

Closing Loopholes on Finished Products

One of the most significant risks to the success of the *Chip-for-Chip* tariff strategy lies in overlooking the products that contain semiconductors — the finished goods that dominate global trade. As *Reuters* recently reported, most of America's imported chips arrive in finished electronic products — from smartphones and laptops to vehicles and industrial machinery .

Yet, trade data—and the tariffs based on them—record only what crosses the border as a finished product, not the components inside. An iPhone shipped from China is logged as a "phone," even though it contains chips from Taiwan, screens from South Korea, and cameras from Japan. Because of this, most semiconductors enter the U.S. embedded within imported electronics, vehicles, and machinery—meaning official trade data dramatically understate America's true dependence on foreign chips.

For example, official statistics of import penetration—the share of the U.S. market supplied by imports—may be understated by at least 14% points once these hidden chip imports are properly accounted for (figure 5).[1]

Figure 5



Source: Global Trade Tracker (HS 8542), AEI, SIA • Chart based off 2024 statistics and estimates from AEI of roughly $50 billion in U.S. chip imports that are not accounted for in official statistics.

In practice, this means that if tariffs apply only to chips but not to the products containing them, multinational companies will simply relocate final assembly overseas and ship completed products back to the United States, bypassing the intent of the policy entirely.

[1] Calculations were based on AEI's estimates of chip production ($68 billion) and Census data on U.S. direct chip imports ($40 billion) and exports ($50 billion) to calculate an apparent consumption value of $58 billion. From this, import penetration was estimated at 69% ($40 billion divided by $58 billion). AEI's hidden-import estimate of roughly $50 billion in embedded chips raised the numerator to $90 billion and denominator to $108 billion to arrive at an import penetration value of 83%.

To address this loophole, the administration must implement a dual-track enforcement framework combining two tariff tools:

1. **Section 232 Tariffs** applied to the *chip value* inside imported products; and
2. **IEEPA Tariffs** applied to the *non-chip value* of those finished goods.

This two-pronged system is essential for both legal and practical reasons. The Section 232 tariffs target semiconductors specifically as a *national security threat*, ensuring that the foreign-produced chip content within imported goods is appropriately penalized. The IEEPA tariffs, on the other hand, extend coverage to the rest of the product's value — the casing, screens, wiring, and assembly — which often serve as the vehicles for tariff circumvention. Together, they create a seamless mechanism to ensure that foreign manufacturers and U.S. importers cannot game the system by shifting the location of their final assembly operations or by claiming that a product is exempt simply because the chip is "part of a larger item."

Critics, including some industry lobbyists quoted by the *Wall Street Journal*, have argued that such a framework would be "too complex" or "administratively burdensome." But this is the same line of reasoning that has been used for decades to justify loopholes in trade enforcement — the very excuses that allowed foreign producers to gut U.S. manufacturing in the first place. The reality is that complexity in enforcement reflects the complexity of modern supply chains. Tariff policy must evolve to meet that challenge. Ignoring embedded chip value would mean accepting a hollow victory — tariffs on raw chips that do nothing to restore American production.

Moreover, this dual-track approach levels the playing field for domestic manufacturers. Without it, a company that builds computers or vehicles in the U.S. — sourcing chips from American fabs — would be undercut by competitors importing fully assembled products built abroad with cheap, foreign chips. In other words, without IEEPA tariffs, the policy would punish U.S. producers for doing the right thing.

Finally, the dual-track framework ensures that the administration maintains full leverage in trade negotiations. By applying both 232 and IEEPA authorities, Washington can adjust tariff levels dynamically — easing one or both measures selectively for trusted allies or firms that meet domestic sourcing requirements. That flexibility is not a weakness; it is a strength. It gives the U.S. the capacity to tailor enforcement while preserving the overarching objective: **ensuring that all products sold in the American market, whether chips or finished electronics, contribute to American production and national security.**

In short, a *chip-only* tariff regime would be like plugging one leak in a sinking ship while ignoring the others. The dual 232–IEEPA approach closes the loopholes comprehensively — making sure that the *Chip-for-Chip* strategy works in practice, not just on paper.

From Idle Capacity to Industrial Power: Putting America's Fabs to Work

America cannot build its way out of dependence on foreign chips unless it first creates sustained *demand* for U.S.-made semiconductors. The United States already has substantial domestic chipmaking capacity — but much of it sits underutilized. Even before the next generation of fabrication plants in Arizona, Ohio, and Texas come online, many existing fabs are running well below capacity. As industry reports and internal company statements have made clear, U.S. facilities owned by Intel, Texas Instruments, Micron, and GlobalFoundries could produce more — **if there were customers.**

The reason for this underutilization is simple: multinational technology companies — from Apple to Dell to General Motors — continue to source most of their chips from overseas, primarily Taiwan and South Korea, where production costs are lower and government

subsidies are enormous. While new investment in domestic fabs under the CHIPS Act is essential, **investment alone cannot sustain an industry that lacks steady, reliable demand.** The U.S. must ensure that its existing semiconductor infrastructure is fully utilized before adding capacity, or risk building gleaming, taxpayer-supported facilities that operate at half potential.

This is why the *Chip-for-Chip* tariff strategy is indispensable. It complements the CHIPS Act by guaranteeing market demand for chips produced on U.S. soil. By requiring major purchasers — including Apple, Lenovo, HP, and automotive manufacturers — to buy domestically produced chips or face steep tariffs, the administration ensures that America's semiconductor ecosystem is not just expanding but thriving. In other words, **tariffs turn investment into production.** Without them, U.S. fabs will remain idle, investors will lose confidence, and America will continue subsidizing the growth of its competitors.

Once domestic demand is secured and existing fabs are operating at full tilt, attention must turn to scaling efficiently. New fabs in Arizona, Ohio, and Texas will add capacity in critical advanced nodes, but they must be integrated into a coherent national industrial framework — one that ties together production, workforce development, and supply chain security. The United States cannot afford to treat these projects as isolated corporate initiatives. They are national assets.

To succeed, the administration must simultaneously address the regulatory and logistical barriers that slow construction and raise costs. Building a fab in the U.S. still takes nearly twice as long as in Taiwan or South Korea, largely due to permitting delays, environmental reviews, and inconsistent local zoning processes. These bureaucratic inefficiencies threaten to erode the competitive advantage that tariffs and industrial incentives are designed to create.

A regulatory fast-track program for semiconductor projects is therefore critical. Streamlining approvals for strategic manufacturing investments — without sacrificing environmental standards — would cut timelines, reduce costs, and make the U.S. the preferred destination for semiconductor investment. Combined with strong *Chip-for-Chip* tariffs, this policy would deliver both sides of the equation: demand and capacity.

The United States has already proven it can build world-class fabs. Now, it must ensure they are filled with world-class demand. A true industrial strategy doesn't just build factories — it keeps them running.

CPA Estimates: Tariff Revenue and Investment Impact of the Chip-for-Chip Strategy

CPA modeling illustrates how the Chip-for-Chip policy could generate $230 billion of tariff revenue over five years, while catalyzing an estimated $153 billion in new private-sector semiconductor investment in the United States.[2]

Under the proposal, importers of foreign-made semiconductors receive temporary import credits equal to their verified investments in U.S. fabrication plants. These credits allow companies to import an equivalent number of chips tariff-free while their domestic capacity is under construction. Once the facilities become operational, no additional credits can be earned, and importers must maintain a one-to-one ratio between U.S. production and foreign imports. Imports beyond that threshold face a 100 percent tariff.

[2] The model uses a simple static partial-equilibrium framework that holds key trade variables constant and estimates the direct effects of the Chip-for-Chip tariff on semiconductor imports, tariff revenue, and onshoring investment within the U.S. chip industry. Revenues and investment outcomes depend on several implementation variables, including the tariff rate applied, the share of imports eligible for temporary credits, the pace at which those credits phase out as domestic fabs come online, and the enforcement of exemptions and leakage. Changes in any of these parameters—especially faster onshoring, stricter enforcement, or a lower credit share—would increase tariff revenue, while slower build-outs or broader exemptions would reduce it.

Using 2024 trade data and industry estimates, CPA constructed a five-year projection to evaluate the potential fiscal and industrial outcomes of the Chip-for-Chip policy (table 1). The model assumes:

- **Tariff base:** *$90 billion in annual semiconductor import value (≈$40 billion in reported chip imports + $50 billion embedded in finished goods).*
- **Tariff rate:** *100 percent on imports exceeding U.S. production commitments.*
- **Exemptions and leakage:** *15 percent combined (to account for potential exemptions, enforcement losses, and reclassification of products by exporters).*
- **Temporary import credits:** *Begin at 60 percent of imports in Year 1 and decline by 10 percentage points annually as U.S. fabs come online.*
- **Time horizon:** *5 years.*

Table 1. Chip-for-Chip Policy Could Raise $230 billion Over 5 Years

CPA Baseline Estimate of Tariff Revenue Collected vs. Credits Forgiven Under the Chip-for-Chip Strategy, 2025–2029

Year	Credit share (c_t)	Assessable imports ($B)	Tariff revenue collected ($B)	Credits forgiven ($B)
1	60.00	76.50	30.60	45.90
2	50.00	76.50	38.30	38.30
3	40.00	76.50	45.90	30.60
4	30.00	76.50	53.60	22.90
5	20.00	76.50	61.20	15.30
TOTAL			229.50	153.00

Source: Census Bureau, SIA, BCG • Calculations are based on CPA's baseline Chip-for-Chip model. The tariff base assumes $90 billion in annual semiconductor import value, consisting of approximately $40 billion in reported chip imports and $50 billion in chips embedded in imported finished goods. A combined 15 percent deduction for exemptions and enforcement leakage reduces the assessable value to $76.5 billion per year. A 100 percent tariff rate is applied to imports exceeding U.S. production commitments. Temporary import credits—granted to firms that pledge equivalent U.S. fab investment—start at 60 percent of assessable imports in Year 1 and decline by ten percentage points annually as new capacity comes online. Tariff revenue equals the portion of assessable imports subject to duty [Assessable × (1 – credit share)], while credits forgiven represent the portion offset by qualifying investment [Assessable × (credit share)].

The National Security Dimension

Semiconductors are not merely consumer products; they are the command infrastructure of modern civilization. From fighter jets and satellites to autonomous vehicles and AI supercomputers, every advanced technology depends on reliable access to chips.

If that access is controlled by China, the consequences are unthinkable.

China's rare earth export crackdown proves that Beijing is willing to weaponize economic dependencies for geopolitical gain. The CCP is signaling to the world: *comply with our rules, or we will choke off your access to critical materials.*

This is not theoretical. In recent years, Beijing has already restricted exports of gallium and germanium — key elements for chipmaking — in retaliation for U.S. export controls. Now, it has expanded its authority to cover *every* product containing rare earths processed in China.

Let that sink in. Under this new regime, the CCP claims the right to control the export of any good — anywhere in the world — that contains even trace amounts of Chinese-origin materials.

If countries or companies resist? Then the cranes, cars, computers, and critical systems that rely on those materials could simply stop working.

This is why the United States must achieve complete internal resiliency. The critical capabilities that sustain our society cannot be gated by another country's whims.

As Secretary Lutnick told *NewsNation:*

> *"The model is, if you can't make your own chips, how can you defend yourself? You're going to rely on someone far away? How are you going to get the chips here to make your drones, to make your equipment?"*

He's right. And now, the rare earth crisis shows this logic applies across the board — from chips and minerals to metals, batteries, and pharmaceuticals.

Global Momentum for Industrial Sovereignty

Other nations are already recognizing the danger of Chinese control. Just this month, the Dutch government took the extraordinary step of seizing control of *Nexperia*, a Chinese-owned semiconductor company in the Netherlands, citing national security concerns.

The Netherlands — one of the world's leading semiconductor hubs — is now leading by example. If the Dutch government is willing to take bold action to protect its chip industry, the United States has no excuse for timidity.

The Biden administration's policies of appeasement — from the solar tariff moratorium to its slow-walked response to Chinese rare earth dominance — only deepened America's vulnerabilities. The Trump administration's decisive actions, including the *Chip-for-Chip* tariffs, represent a long-overdue course correction.

The Window for Action Is Closing

Time is running out. China's aggressive moves — from its extraterritorial rare earth decree to its growing military presence in the Taiwan Strait — show that the CCP is preparing to weaponize global trade in a way that they never have before.

If the United States fails to act decisively now, the next crisis could make COVID-era supply shocks look trivial.

The Trump administration's *Chip-for-Chip* tariffs, if implemented with discipline and accountability, could reindustrialize America's most critical sector, create hundreds of thousands of high-quality jobs, and safeguard the nation's future. But hesitation or compromise would squander the moment.

As Jamie Dimon warned:

> *"It has become painfully clear that the United States has allowed itself to become too reliant on unreliable sources of critical minerals, products, and manufacturing."*

If America doesn't reclaim control over its own manufacturing now, there may come a day when the cranes stop moving, the computers stop running, and the cars stop rolling — not because we lack innovation, but because we surrendered our independence.

The Fight for Industrial Freedom

The message from Beijing is unmistakable: submit or suffer. The message from Washington must be even clearer: America will never be economically subservient to the Chinese Communist Party.

Through *Chip-for-Chip* tariffs, regulatory reform, and corporate accountability, the Trump administration can finish what it started — restoring America's industrial might, securing its technological future, and ensuring that no foreign government ever again holds the power to turn off our economy.

The window for action is narrow, but the choice is simple. America can remain free, sovereign, and secure — or it can remain dependent.

The time to choose is now.